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Abstract 
 
In 2003, Kenya introduced a nationwide Free Primary Education (FPE) reform, abolishing school 
fees in all public schools. As a result, enrolment rates in public primary schools rose by 15 percent, 
putting significant pressure on the educational system. Overcrowding and lack of school material 
caused many parents to turn to private school alternatives. Using a nationally representative cross-
sectional household survey, I exploit intra-household variation in terms of school enrolment to 
measure private versus public school effectiveness in terms of math, English and Swahili test scores. 
My findings suggest that, on average, private school students score 18, 23 and 21 percentage points of 
a standard deviation higher than public school students, respectively. As my results are likely to be 
exposed to a selection bias stemming from high-achieving students being sorted into fee-charging 
private schools, I include household fixed effects and an extensive set of household-related controls. 
Moreover, I prove that when attempting to control for such sorting effects, half of the effect 
disappears. I thus argue that the remaining effect can be interpreted as evidence of private schools 
being more effective than public schools. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Education is widely recognized as a key contributor to economic growth (Hanushek and 
Woessmann, 2012). Equally important, it can be an efficient pathway for underprivileged 
families to escape poverty. A recently published evaluation of the Millenium Development 
Goal of universal primary education for all children by 2015 concludes that substantial 
progress has been made in terms of reducing the number of out-of-school primary children. In 
sub-Saharan Africa, this share dropped by 25 percent, from 43.7 million down to 32.7 million 
children between 2000 and 2012 (UNICEF, 2015). These encouraging advances in enrolment 
rates have been sparked by large-scale programs such as the School Fee Abolition Initiative 
(SFAI), launched by UNICEF and the World Bank in 2005, which has assisted a range of 
developing countries in designing school fee abolition policies targeted at public schools 
(UNICEF, 2009). 
With such a dramatic increase in the number of primary students going to school however, 
concerns in terms of productivity have arisen. Whether or not public schools are able to 
maintain quality as pupil-teacher ratios rise and school material such as textbooks become 
increasingly scarce have become compelling arguments for parents to transfer their children 
to private schools. As evident by the fact that private schools are becoming more and more 
popular in many developing countries, there seems to be a widely held belief that public 
schools are less effective than private schools (Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006). Many studies show 
that students attending private schools achieve better learning outcomes; however, whether 
this is due to private schools’ greater effectiveness or due to selection of higher-achieving 
students into private schools remains an open question. 
In this paper, I study how attending private versus public school affects student 
achievement in the context of Kenya, where private school enrolment rose dramatically after 
the abolition of school fees in 2003. This reform, which is commonly referred to as the Free 
Primary Education (FPE) reform, increased school enrolment in public schools by 15 percent. 
In turn, this prompted many parents to send their children to private schools amid concerns 
about deteriorating quality of education in public schools due to crowding.  
To assess the effectiveness of private versus public schools, I use three different grade 
outcomes to measure learner outcomes: math, English and Swahili test scores. My data comes 
from Uwezo which is a nationally representative cross-sectional survey containing 
comprehensive information about households and their childrens’ schooling. All five waves 
available are used in my analysis, covering the years 2009/10 to 2014. As I do not have access 
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to a randomized sample, I need to address some methodological challenges. In particular, I 
investigate if there is a selection bias affecting my results. As mentioned above, it is difficult 
to separate the ‘true’ effectiveness of private schools from an unobserved pre-selection of 
primary students into private schools by their parents. The latter is also called a sorting effect 
and needs to be dealt with in my analysis. I attempt to control for this by exploiting the fact 
that the household-level nature of my data allows me to hold both observed and unobserved 
household factors constant by including household fixed effects in my regression.1 
My findings show that the average private school learner scores 18, 23 and 21 percent of a 
standard deviation higher in terms of math, English and Swahili test scores respectively 
compared to public school learners. These estimates are robust to the inclusion of household 
fixed effects and do not show any signs of discrimination in terms of parents investing 
disproportionally depending on the sex of their child2. More importantly, I find that 
approximately half of the effect dissapears when I control for sorting effects. My analysis 
contributes to the existing literature by presenting suggestive and unbiased evidence of costly 
private schools being more effective in terms of learner outcomes than free public schools, 
proving that there is a payoff associated with investing in private education. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, I summarize the previous research 
regarding schooling choice and student performance in Section 2. Then, I explain the 
decision-making process parents face when wanting to enrol their child in school, as well as 
primary education in Kenya in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 deal with the data used in my 
analysis and the identification strategy. In Section 6, I present and interpret my results, and  
Section 7 consists of a concluding discussion. 
 
 
2 Empirical Literature 
 
There is a widespread beflief that private schools are more effective than public schools in 
terms of quality, with characteristics such as class size and the supply of school material. 
Voucher programs, where families are provided the opportunity to select into schools, have 
been thoroughly investigated in a range of countries (see, among others, Angrist et al., 2002; 
Ladd, 2002; Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006; McEwan et al., 2008) and offer some insight into the 
decision making process of families when selecting their children into schools. It should be 
                                                
1 The terms ‘sorting’ and ’selection bias’ are used interchangeably throughout this paper. 
2 Examined by controlling for birth order within the household and interacting this variable with gender. 
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noted, however, that the results are mixed and often suffer from difficulties with identifying a 
causal effect of any such program. 
Most notably, Angrist et al. (2002) investigate the case of Colombia, where lotteries were 
used to distribute vouchers to families. The policy allowed the authors to rely on a quasi-
experimental design to find that lottery winners were 15 percentage points more likely to 
attend private schools and have completed 0.1 additional years of schooling. Moreover, the 
comparison revealed differences in test results between lottery participants. Lottery winners 
scored around 0.2 standard deviations higher than those who lost, although not highly 
significant. This effect was proven both stronger and more significant for girls than for boys. 
Given these results, the authors discuss sorting and the difficulty of isolating the effects of 
competitiveness on school quality. They argue that whether an increase in private schools 
affects the public school system is ultimately going to be determined by the attraction of 
higher-performing students to private alternatives, posing a methodological challenge in terms 
of causality. 
In addition to the qualitative differences above, on average, students in private schools 
seem to outperform those in public schools (e.g., Hanushek and Taylor, 1990; Jimenez and 
Lockheed, 1995; Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006).  
In Chile, Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) provide evidence that a nationwide voucher program 
resulted in more than 1000 private school entering the market and increased enrolment rates 
in private schools by more than 20 percent, particularly in richer neighbourhoods. The authors 
investigate the effect of free schooling choice on sorting and measure the relative differences 
in average academic achievement between private and public schools over time. Built upon 
strong assumptions, they find that a sorting effect is present as the relative performance of 
private schools increased post the voucher program, leading to a decrease by almost 40 
percent of a standard deviation as a result of a one standard deviation increase in the private 
enrolment rates. In addition, they find that the students who relocated away from public to 
private schools tend to come from families with high levels of income and well-educated 
parents. Again however, the authors were faced with the issue of a selection bias. 
Using a similar strategy, Bold et al. (2010) examine the case of Kenyas Free Primary 
Education (FPE) policy on potential selection of low-achieving students into no-fee public 
primary schools. The authors use administrative household data to find a larger share of high-
performing students in fee-charging private schools relative to public schools post the reform, 
argued mainly to be the result of the interaction between class size and peer effects.  
More specifically, they identify two important mechanisms at play. One being lowered 
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test score results on average due to an expansion in the overall number of test-takers in both 
types of schools. This effect is then counteracted by an observed transfer of high-performing 
students from public to private schools. Their test score data is drawn from the Kenyan 
Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE), an exam administered to all students finishing 
primary education across both public and private schools, using standardized test results as a 
measure of academic performance. Similar to Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) and Angrist et al. 
(2002), no causal effect can be identified in terms of learner outcomes due to omitted variable 
bias. 
A more recent study by Lucas and Mbiti (2012) uses the same test score database in a 
difference-in-differences framework to examine the impact of the FPE policy on student 
achievement for pupils in the eight and final grade of primary school. The authors exploit 
differences between districts in terms of the intensity of dropout rates to find that the program 
both increased student access and had some sorting effects in terms of completed primary 
education, measured as the number of test takers in public and private schools. They manage 
to find a decreased share of test takers in the lower-ranked private schools, indicating a 
transfer either towards free public schools or higher-ranked private alternatives. Moreover, 
their findings show that the new policy led to minor decreases in the range of between 0 and 5 
percent of a standard devation in average KCPE exam scores in both public and private 
schools, significant at the 10 percent level. Lucas and Mbiti (2012) conclude that despite the 
presence of sorting and the lack of investments to compensate the large inflow of new public 
schools students, the program was welfare enhancing. 
Overall, there seems to be an absence of literature sufficiently proving that private schools 
seem to be more beneficial in terms of academic performance for students compared to public 
schools. Although some papers have examined such disparities, no study that I have found has 
managed to effectively control for the presence of sorting effects. More specifically, papers 
such as Lucas and Mbiti (2012) and Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) measure changes in outcomes 
at the aggregate (district) level and are unable to control for unobservable household 
characteristics such as academic ability or genes which are correlated with school choice and 
likely to bias the results. 
Lastly, whereas the FPE reform in Kenya has been analysed in terms of enrolment and 
completion rates in public schools, little attention has been devoted to evaluating the adverse 
qualitative effects in ther interaction between public and private schools. This paper 
contributes to the existing literature by providing robust and unbiased evidence of the 
consequences of such public school programs on the effectiveness of the educational system 
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in the private sector.  
 
3 School Choice and Primary Education in Kenya 
 
3.1 School Choice 
 
What determines a households decision to enrol their child in either a private or a public 
school? Historically, public provision of elementary schooling has been considered a 
fundamental function and responsibility of the government. Although there have always been 
private institutions apparent, more focus has been directed to the benefits of a diversified 
educational system. Moreover, since education plays a central role in childrearing and 
economic development, constructing school policies which are cost-effective in generating 
basic cognitive skills has long been a key objective for most developing countries (Levin, 
2002). 
Nonetheless, a long-standing debate has been going on dealing with the issue of whether 
private schools are more efficient than public schools. On one hand, public provision of 
schools allows for a more standardized national curriculum to be promoted to all students in 
terms of behaviour, knowledge and values fundamental to a democratic society. On the other 
hand, democracy also entails freedom of choice as to which school parents would like to enrol 
their child (Glewwe, 2002). In a similar vein, Friedman (1962) argued that a dynamic market 
with more competition will provide additional variety and even higher quality of education as 
the growing extension of governmental responsibility grows unreasonably large. Thus, 
insititutions administered and financed by private actors may be act as good counterweight in 
order to maintain the social and economic gain from education. Either way, holding constant 
educational quality, the effect of fee abolition will ultimately land on the family of the 
affected child and in turn be determined by their preferences. 
From a household perspective, parents are assumed to derive utility from both their own 
consumption of goods and any human capital gains accuring their children. Focusing on the 
latter, we expect it to depend the attributes of the school. Whether the school is private or 
public and fee-charging or free will determine how parents decide to invest in their childrens 
future. In practice, parents will be required to give up some of their own consumption in order 
to invest in potential school fees and material. The invested amount can thus be seen as a 
direct reflection of the household’s beliefs of how large the future earnings of their children 
will be (Alderman et al., 2001). 
Not surprisingly, the above is directly related to the cost of sending a child to school. 
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Assuming that the described utility model holds, fee-abolition may have different impacts 
depending on the level of wealth in a household. For example, a low-income household is 
probably more likely to respond positively to the FPE policy if the saved income is enough to 
raise the incentive for parents to choose to invest in school supplies and other expenses 
related to enrolment, although they might consider it to be a risky investment. In contrary, 
wealthier households may be more likely to choose a school offering the best attributes in 
terms of educational quality for their children, regardless of school type and cost.  
Against this background, it should be noted that primary education still might not be 
entirely free. Indirect costs such as expenses for school material may still be a limitation for 
the family to invest in their childs schooling. In Malawi for example, where the newly-elected 
government implemented a nationwide fee-abolition reform in all public schools in 1994, the 
policy initiative gave rise to a dramatic increase in access to basic education. Despite the 
increased enrolment rates however, the no-fee policy was highly criticized as considerable 
indirect schooling costs remained a barrier to households who had to invest in clothes, books 
and other material necessary for enrolment (Kadzamira and Rose, 2001). 
Equally important to the choice of schooling are household factors which can be expected 
to influence a parents willingness to pay for their childs education. Such factors may include 
parental education, wealth, household size and the gender of the child. For example, a highly 
educated mother is more likely to have a higher earnings potential and thus may want to enrol 
her child in a ‘better’ school, perhaps with smaller classes and proper school material, 
compared to a non-educated mother. Moreover, tuition fees are commonly perceived as being 
a good indicator of school quality as a whole (Lockheed et al., 1991). This type of sorting 
could potentially lead to differences in grades between fee-charging private and no-fee public 
schools and needs to be controlled for in my analysis as it is not directly related to the schools 
effectiveness. 
Schooling opportunities might also look different for boys and girls. Gender disparities 
are widely believed to be apparent in developing countries, often in favour of boys. More 
specifically, time spent in school is expected to have an opportunity cost in the form of 
foregone household or market work. This cost may skew slightly higher for girls as they are 
often considered more likely to help their mothers with domestic work such as child care. In 
addition, studies have revealed that male-biased differential treatment in terms of childhood 
investments is apparent in some developing countries (see, for example, Sen, 1990; Behrman, 
1992; Rose, 2000). In order to investigate if this is the case in my sample, I attempt to control  
for differential treatment and conduct a heterogeneity analysis in Section 6. 
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3.2 Primary Education in Kenya 
 
The Kenyan government has long been committed to improving the social status of the 
large share of marginalized and underprivileged children. Every Kenyan child should have the 
right of access to free and compulsory basic education, as stated in the Kenyan Constitution 
(UNESCO, 2010). Poor enrolment trends have not been uncommon throughout Kenyan 
history, however. These effects have been most notable in rural areas characterized by low 
economic development and poor living standards. Such areas often suffer from both low 
enrolment and completion rates, leading to large within-country disparities between urban and 
rural districts. Consequently, the Kenyan government has put emphasis on expanding access 
to the public education system, especially for disadvantaged families (UNESCO, 2015). 
Kenya also has an interesting history of fee abolition. The abolishment of public primary 
school fees was first implemented as an instrument to encourage enrolment and empower 
vulnerable children in Kenya towards the end of the 1970s. At the time, the Free Primary 
Education (FPE) reform was targeted only at certain primary schools, but was later expanded 
in 1978. The goal was to reduce the financial burden of education in order to mitigate the 
direct opportunity costs of schooling for poor families. The reform did have a substantial 
effect after its conclusion in 1978 as enrolment rates in primary school went from 86 percent 
in 1977 to 115 percent in 1980 (Republic of Kenya, 1988).  
This came at a large cost, however. In 1988, the Kenyan government had to cut down on 
primary school funding due to the limited education budget. As part of the Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs), a new program was launched which instead directed some of 
the expenses at the parents of the enroled children. Schools started charging fees again and the 
new policy left parents responsible for acquiring schooling material and even the funding of 
new school buildings. Consequently, dropout rates rose and the previous high enrolment rates 
decreased by 20 percent in only 3 years (Republic of Kenya, 1988, 1991 and 2003). 
The next large initiative came in January in 2003 when Kenyan policymakers took an 
important step towards reversing the negative trends and reintroduced the Free Primary 
Education (FPE) program as part of a large political campaign. The program meant a 
nationwide elimination of fees in all public primary schools through each school receiving an 
earmarked central government grant two times each year in order to cover school-related 
expenses. In the year of the introduction, total primary school enrolment rose by 
approximately 18 percent, from 6.1 million to 7.2 million, while the number of teachers in 
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primary schools merely increased from 178,037 to 178,622 (Republic of Kenya, 2004). 
The sudden increase in enroled students came with a number of challenges. As the 
dramatic rise in students was not accompanied by a similar increase in the number of primary 
school teachers, overcrowding in schools became an issue. Pupil-teacher ratios rose from 34:1 
in 2002 to 40:1 in 2003, sometimes forcing students to study outside of the classroom and 
putting more stress on teachers (Muyanga et al., 2010).  
One example comes from Sanders (2007) who describes the case of Olympic, one of 
Kenyas highest-performing primary schools, in which the FPE led to an increase in average 
class size to almost 84 students, double the previous size. Additional impacts were observed 
in terms of lowered academic performance and a school budget stretched to its limits. School 
material became increasingly scarce resulting in students lacking textbooks, desks and other 
supplies which can be considered necessary for proper learning. There is even evidence 
proving that more qualified teachers transferred away from public primary schools to private 
and secondary alternatives (Lucas and Mbiti, 2012). Consequently, the FPE program gave rise 
to serious concerns in terms of the quality of public schooling. 
In response to the more prominent role of the government in Kenyan public education, the 
market for non-free private alternatives grew rapidly. As parents became aware of the 
worsening schooling conditions of their children in public schools, those who could afford it 
sought other alternatives (Bold et al., 2013). Between 1999 and 2006, the number of private 
schools increased from 569 to 1,839, while the number of public schools only increased from 
17,054 to 17,946 (Muyanga et al., 2010).  
In short, despite Kenyas ambitious efforts to improve the access and quality of public 
education, government officials have not managed to back their policy with enough resources. 
The country has failed to adapt to the dramatic increase in the demand for public schools, 
lacking investments in teacher salaries, material and classrooms. In the sections below, we 
will see how this has affected the learners who responded to the deteriorating quality by 
enroling in private schools. 
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4 Data 
 
The dataset used in my analysis comes from Twaweza’s dataset on learning, Uwezo, 
which is a nationally representative, repeated cross-section survey conducted in a large 
number of Kenyan households3. The questionnaires contain detailed and comprehensive 
information on household, village and school level. The survey incorporates a large sub-set of 
Kenyan children, including those who are not attending school, and allows a link to be made 
between learners and schools. I include all five waves available of the survey, covering the 
years 2009/10 to 2014. After extracting the observations central to my analysis, namely 
children aged between 6 to 15 who report to be enroled in a primary school (grades 1 to 8), 
the final sample consists of 492,901 observations across 158 districts4.  
I use three outcome variables to measure any changes in educational achievement: math, 
English and Swahili test scores. These outcomes were measured through tests administered by 
the Uwezo survey asking school-aged children (both enroled and not enroled) a series of basic 
literacy and numeracy questions5. The tests are designed to assess the basic competence after 
having completed two years of schooling, which, according to the national curriculum in 
Kenya, is thought to be enough time to have acquired a solid foundation for future learning 
(Jones et al., 2014). 
Cognitive achievement in terms of math is assessed by having students answer six 
different questions covering basic number skills such as counting, addition and division. Math 
scores range from 1 to 8, where 1 is the lowest achievable score and 8 the highest. Language 
skills are evaluated on the basis of the students ability to read a short sentence, recognize 
letters and words as well as comprehension as a whole. Uwezo tests incorporate both English 
and Swahili as these are the two main languages taught in Kenyan primary schools. Language 
scores range from 1 to 5 in a similar manner to the numeracy test. 
The independent variable of interest in my analysis consists of a dummy indicating school 
type which takes on value 1 if it is private and 0 if it is a public school. The total number of 
schools amount to 54,259 private (11 percent) and 428,071 public schools in my extracted 
sample. 
I include a set of household-specific control variables in order to account for a range of 
preconditions which may affect the decision to enrol a child in public vs. private school. Such 
                                                
3 For more details and documentation, see ”www.uwezo.net”. 
4 In the final sample, only households containing two or more siblings where one goes to private and one to 
public school will be used as variation. This is explained in more detail in Section 5. 
5 Tests were conducted at the time of the survey. 
11 
	
factors include the mother’s level education, household size, number of other children in the 
household, the material used to build the houses’ outer walls (used as a proxy to indicate the 
wealth level of the household) and two dummy variables indicating whether or not the 
household has access to electricity and water. Table 1 below presents an overview of the final 
sample and all of the variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the descriptive statistics provide some insight into the distribution and 
characteristics of my sample, it may prove even more valuable to look closer at the 
demographics of those who attend private schools. Table 2 below shows the results from a 
regression using the private school dummy as the outcome and the variables age, gender, type 
of wall on the house (as a wealth proxy), the number of children and size of the household 
and the mother’s level of education as independent variables.  
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max N
Age 10.46 2.718 6 15 492901
Male .5078 .4999 0 1 492901
Female .4922 .4999 0 1 492901
Mothers edu = Primary .7438 .4366 0 1 334736
Mothers edu = Secondary .2424 .4285 0 1 334736
Mothers edu = Post secondary .0138 .1168 0 1 334736
Household size 6.484 2.348 1 16 492901
No. children in household 3.443 1.589 1 15 492901
House wall = Polythene .5995 .4899 0 1 492901
House wall = Iron sheet .0066 .0813 0 1 492901
House wall = Timber .0691 .2536 0 1 492901
House wall = Stone/Bricks .2223 .4157 0 1 492901
Household has electricity .1755 .3801 0 1 492901
Household has water supply .3552 .4785 0 1 483951
Private school .1125 .3159 0 1 482330
English score 3.905 1.281 1 5 492901
Math score 6.128 2.167 1 8 492901
Swahili score 3.954 1.313 1 5 492901
Outcome variables
Demographic variables
Treatment variable
Note:  'Type of house wall' refers to the material used to build the walls in the house. 
Test score outcomes are measured using an ordinal scale.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
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Table 2. Demographics of private school students 
VARIABLES Private school
Age = 7 -0.0276***
(0.00553)
Age = 8 -0.0615***
(0.00553)
Age = 9 -0.0827***
(0.0106)
Age = 10 -0.114***
(0.0123)
Age = 11 -0.123***
(0.0147)
Age = 12 -0.141***
(0.0144)
Age = 13 -0.160***
(0.0160)
Age = 14 -0.181***
(0.0179)
Age = 15 -0.189***
(0.0179)
Female 0.000632
(0.00194)
Wall = Polythene -0.0313***
(0.0115)
Wall = Iron sheet 0.124***
(0.0291)
Wall = Timber 0.051***
(0.00893)
Wall = Stone/Bricks 0.180***
(0.0271)
Mothers edu = Primary 0.027***
(0.0066)
Mothers edu = Secondary 0.139***
(0.0105)
Mothers edu = Post secondary 0.333***
(0.2101)
Household size -0.00242**
(0.00112)
No. children in household -0.0210***
(0.00278)
Observations 482,330
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by district
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The findings suggest a few important things. First of all, by looking at the age variable, 
there seems to be a growing trend towards enrolling children in private schools. This can be 
observed in the table by looking at the decreasing coefficient as age increases and means that 
young children in families are more likely to be enroled in private schools compared to their 
older siblings.  
Secondly, households who enrol their children in private schools seem to live in houses 
with walls built with better material, indicating a higher level of wealth. As discussed in 
Section 3, this is a probable reflection of the relative costs of enrolling a child in either a 
private or a public school, suggesting that private schools attract higher-income families. 
Although it would have been more optimal to use a crude measure of income level, the 
dataset did not include any such variable. Related to this, private school students are more 
likely to come from families where the mother is highly educated. These findings are similar 
to those in Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) and indicate that highly educated parents are more 
likely to invest more resources into their childrens schooling. 
Lastly, Table 2 suggests that households who choose private schooling have fewer family 
members and children on average than those in the public educational system. Although this 
coefficient is very small, it is highly significant. A simple explanation to this could be that the 
surrounding costs associated with having a large family do not leave enough resources to 
afford private school fees for the children. 
 
 
5 Methodology 
 
I seek to examine if investing in private schooling is worth it in terms of childrens’ 
educational outcomes. In other words, I evaluate the effectiveness of private vs. public 
schools in the context of Kenya.  
Ideally, I would have had access to a sample where children were randomly allocated into 
different schools. Randomization would have allowed me to compare the academic 
achievements of children without having to worry about potential selection biases being 
present in the composition of private and public school children. However, as such data is not 
available to me, I am forced to deal with some challenges regarding my empirical results 
associated with the observational data used in my analysis. 
 My identification strategy lies within a standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
framework and consists of exploiting differences in average scholastic achievement between 
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students in privately and publicly owned schools in Kenyas 158 districts, measured as three 
different grade outcomes between the years 2009/10 and 2014, six years after the FPE policy 
was introduced. The grade outcomes take the form of math, English and Swahili test scores.  
As mentioned above, there are important methodological issues which need to be 
addressed when performing this kind of analysis. First, the backgrounds of public and private 
school students are likely to differ from one another. Again related to the discussion in 
Section 3, family characteristics may be the determinant of the success of their children in 
school rather than simply the type of institution that he or she attends. For example, children 
whose mothers are highly educated are more likely to send their children to a private school. 
This effect can be observed in Table 2 and could constitute a potential source of selection bias 
in a simple OLS regression of achievement on private schools as it would not reflect a causal 
effect. 
Similarly, a bias could be present in my results if there was a systematic pre-selection of 
students into schools. For example, as more and more private schools enter the market, 
families might not transfer a child who is already enroled in a public school mid-term, but 
rather send a younger sibling to private school. Such behaviour could potentially understate 
the true effect of the FPE program. However, it could also be the case that parents invest more 
in their first-born child and thus choose to pay the fee associated with a private school for the 
first-born but not for younger siblings. The presence of such bias would lead to an 
overestimation of the effect of the FPE policy. To examine this, as selection bias is non-
observable and difficult to control for without a randomized sample, I implicitly rely on my 
household fixed effects and control for birth order throughout all regressions6. 
I construct four different specifications, all of which regress the test scores on the private 
school indicator. The first only controls for the child’s age, the second also incorporates 
district fixed effects, the third socio-demographic controls and the fourth is a full specification 
in which the district fixed effects are replaced by household fixed effects. I then repeat the 
four specifications using English and Swahili test scores as the dependent variable. 
As a first step to mitigate potential bias due to non-random selection into schools, I 
estimate specifications which control for socio-demographic factors related to childrens’ 
backgrounds and household characteristics. In addition, district fixed effects are included in 
order to control for unobserved differences across districts in terms of public and private 
school achievement. These specifications can be summarized with Equation (1) below: 
                                                
6 Specifically, birth order is included as an interaction with gender in order to account for the possibility that 
parents invest disproportionally in their children’s education based on the sex of the child. 
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 𝑆"#$% = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉"#$% + 𝛾𝐻"#$% + 𝛿$ + 𝜆% + 𝜀"$#%  (1) 
 
where 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉"#$% indicated whether it is a private (=1) or a public (=0) school in which 
student 𝑖 in household ℎ in district 𝑑 and year 𝑡 is enroled; 𝑆"#$% the dependent variable 
consisting of either math, English or Swahili test scores for the same child; 𝐻"#$% is a vector 
of observable socio-demographic characteristics for household ℎ in district 𝑑 and year 𝑡; 𝛿$ 
corresponds to district fixed effects; 𝜆% year fixed effects and 𝜀"$#% is the error term. 𝛽 is the 
coefficient of interest in this analysis. Throughout all regressions, standard errors are clustered 
on the district level and observations are weighed according to their occurrence in the random 
sample. 
Even with extensive controls however, the coefficient related to the school indicator may 
still be biased due to unobserved factors such as academic ability and genes which are 
correlated with school choice and hence cannot be controlled for. In order to deal with this 
concern, I estimate a model with household fixed effects. 
Accordingly, Equation (1) is modified slightly, resulting in the final specification below: 
 
 𝑆"#$% = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉"#$% + 𝛾𝐻"#$% + 𝜔# + 𝜆% + 𝜀"$#%  (2) 
 
where the district fixed effects, 𝛿$, have been replaced by 𝜔#, referring to household fixed 
effects.  
A key interpretational strength with Equation (2) is that it relies on within-household 
variation between siblings, taking into account endogenous factors such as family background 
and household environment which are highly likely to influence the choice of schooling. 
Thus, the measured effect of the FPE program on test scores should not be distorted by 
relative differences in preconditions between households. An example of such a concern 
could be that public school students may have enjoyed less of a background advantage 
compared to private school students. Moreover, variables which may be systematically 
correlated on the district level with both grades and the type of school over time are controlled 
for with the inclusion of both household and year fixed effects. In the next section, I present 
the regression outcomes from these two equations and discuss the results based on the 
methodological approach above. 
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6 Results 
 
I perform a series of regressions using three different educational outcomes as the 
dependent variable: math, English and Swahili test scores. All specifications control for age 
and year fixed effects and are presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5.  
Column 1 shows the very basic OLS regression where test score outcomes are regressed 
on the private school dummy. We can see that being enroled in a private school is associated 
with a 0.70 unit higher math score test result, 0.54 unit higher English result and a 0.50 unit 
higher Swahili result on average. As the math variable takes the form of test results in the 
range of 1 to 8 and the language variables from 1 to 5, the results may at first be hard to 
interpret. Thus, in order to make it easier to compare the three outcomes, I divide the resulting 
coefficients with their respective standard deviations. The resulting effects from these basic 
specification are large, yielding a 32 percent of a standard deviation increase in math scores, 
42 percent for English scores and 38 percent for Swahili test scores. 
In the simple setup above however, we do not expect the link between the choice of 
private education and academic achievement to be causal due to potentially omitted variables 
related to households and selection bias. In addition, differential trends across districts are not 
accounted for, which could further reduce the precision of my estimates.  
Instead, Column 2 in Tables 3 to 5 incorporates district fixed effects to control for such 
trends. The results show that all three coefficients are slightly lowered, indicating that some of 
the variation captured in my model could have been due to differences across districts have 
now been removed. Nonetheless, there may still be a range of household factors which 
influence parents decisions to enrol their children in private schools. I explain how I deal with 
this below. 
In Column 3, a set of socio-demographic controls are included in the specification in order 
to mitigate the potential bias due to non-random selection into schools. These factors are 
likely to be different between households and could, for example, take the form of wealth, 
mother’s education, birth order and gender. Similar to the transition from Column 1 to 2, 
moving to the coefficients in Column 3 presents evidence consistent with the view that socio-
demographic household characteristics are likely to determine much of the variation found in 
my sample. Nonetheless, even if these control variables account for much of the unwanted 
variation in my model, it could still suffer from non-observable selection bias. 
In order to address the above concern of endogenous household factors influencing 
academic achievement, district fixed effects are replaced by household fixed effects. As stated 
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earlier, the inclusion of household fixed effects is key advantage with the use of my dataset 
and allows for variation to take place within families, disregarding dissimilarities between 
households. Column 4 shows the coefficients associated with Equation (2) which is designed 
to only exploit intra-household variation over time. The results from these regressions show 
an 18, 23 and 21 percentage point of a standard deviation increase in math, English and 
Swahili respectively. In comparison to the findings in Column 1, we can see that almost half 
of the effect has been absorbed by the inclusion of the extensive set of control variables and 
the household fixed effects. This leads us back to the discussion about omitted variable bias 
how my results should be interpreted. 
As presented throughout Columns 1 to 4 in all three output tables, the estimated 
coefficients decrease in a stepwise manner when first extending Equation (1) through the 
inclusion of socio-demographic controls and district fixed effects and then replacing it with 
Equation (2) in order to circumvent household omitted variable bias. This development is 
likely to indicate an effective exclusion of endogenous factors which may influence schooling 
decisions not directly related to the FPE policy, and thus provide a more isolated and precise 
estimate of the effect. Specifically, we see that most of the reduction in the coefficients 
happens when moving from Column 1 to 3, i.e from the very basic setup to Equation (1). This 
indicates that much of the unwanted variation stemming from other sources than the direct 
link between school choice and achievement is captured in Equation (1) already. Finally, only 
a minor change takes place between Column 3 and 4 when household fixed effects are 
included in the model, indicating that no significant selection bias should be influencing my 
results. 
To sum up, there seems to be a strong positive effect on student achievement from 
investing in fee-charging private schools compared to free public alternatives. In the final 
specifications based on Equation (2), children in private schools score 18, 23 and 21 
percentage points of a standard deviation higher on average in terms of math, English and 
Swahili test scores than those in public schools. This is a rather substantial difference and, 
supported by Table 2, reflects a larger share of high-performing students being enroled in 
private schools after the FPE reform. In addition, my estimations are robust to both the 
inclusion of household fixed effects and the birth order variable. Judging by the decreasing 
behaviour of the coefficients, my results do not seem to suffer from any selection bias. Hence, 
I argue that the remaining impact of the FPE reform, after the removal of sorting effects, can 
be robustly interpreted as evidence of private education being superior to free public 
schooling in terms of student learning outcomes. 
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Table 3. Regression results using Math scores as outcome 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Math Math Math Math
Private school 0.705*** 0.563*** 0.398*** 0.391***
(0.0349) (0.0358) (0.0274) (0.0213)
Age control YES YES YES YES
Socio-demographic controls NO NO YES YES
District FE NO YES YES NO
Household FE NO NO NO YES
Observations 482,330 482,330 426,230 426,230
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by district. All regressions include year fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4. Regression results using English scores as outcome 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES English English English English
Private school 0.543*** 0.423*** 0.298*** 0.298***
(0.0219) (0.0297) (0.0216) (0.0144)
Age control YES YES YES YES
Socio-demographic controls NO NO YES YES
District FE NO YES YES NO
Household FE NO NO NO YES
Observations 482,330 482,330 426,230 426,230
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by district. All regressions include year fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5. Regression results using Swahili scores as outcome 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Swahili Swahili Swahili Swahili
Private school 0.503*** 0.397*** 0.274*** 0.278***
(0.0227) (0.0309) (0.0231) (0.0158)
Age control YES YES YES YES
Socio-demographic controls NO NO YES YES
District FE NO YES YES NO
Household FE NO NO NO YES
Observations 482,330 482,330 426,230 426,230
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by district. All regressions include year fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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6.1 Heterogeneity Analysis 
 
In addition to the analysis above, I conduct a heterogeneity analysis based on the three 
outcome variables in order to investigate whether the effectiveness of private vs. public 
schools seem to differ between gender. Against the background of Table 2 and the inclusion 
of a birth order variable interacted with gender, I have already showed that there does not 
seem to be a unequal selection of boys or girls into private schools. However, it could still be 
the case that private school attendance benefits boys and girls differently, which is the 
purpose of this analysis.  
Table 6 below shows the regression outcome when interacting the private school indicator 
with the gender variable. The two variables are interacted in order to avoid limiting my 
sample only to households with girls. Columns 1 to 3 indicate that there is a slightly more 
advantageous effect on math scores for girls who enrol in private schools, however not 
strongly significant. On the other hand, this effect is cut in half and loses its significance in 
Column 4, suggesting that the previous specifications are likely to suffer from omitted 
variable bias. The same analysis is conducted using English and Swahili test scores as the 
outcome variable, yielding even less significant results.7  
Based on these findings, I can safely say that I find no robust evidence of any 
disproportionate effects of the effectiveness of private versus public schools for boys and 
girls. Although the first three columns in Table 6 suggests that there is a weak beneficial 
effect present for girls, it should not be interpreted as evidence of heterogeneous impacts 
stemming from private school enrolment as it is both reduced and made insignificant with the 
inclusion of household fixed effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
7 Output tables for these regressions can be found in the Appendix. 
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7 Concluding Discussion 
 
In this paper I evaluate the effectiveness of private vs. public schooling in terms of student 
learning outcomes in the context of Kenya. My identification strategy exploits the 
introduction of Free Primary Education (FPE) in Kenya in 2003 and relies on variation within 
households, stretching across all of Kenyas 158 districts between the years 2009/10 and 2014. 
My variables of interest consists of math, English and Swahili test scores and my independent 
variable is a dummy indicating whether the school is privately or publicly owned. 
A concern was that my results could be driven by factors related to household 
characteristics, not common between families. For instance, private school students might 
have more advantageous backgrounds compared to students enroled in public schools, which 
is likely to overstate the effect of the policy. However, in contrary to other studies which have 
tried to estimate the impact of schooling choice on sorting limited to district fixed effects (e.g. 
Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006; Bold et al., 2010; Lucas and Mbiti, 2012), I manage to address this 
problem by holding constant household information. In addition, despite the methodological 
challenges found in other studies, the findings of this paper are in line with recent research 
surrounding school choice and learner outcomes. 
I run multiple regressions using different specifications and the outcomes mentioned 
above. With the final specification, in which I control for sorting effects, I find that on 
average, math, English and Swahili test scores are 18, 23 and 21 percentage points of a 
standard deviation higher in private than in public schools. This effect can be considered 
Table 6. Heterogeneity analysis using math scores as outcome 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Math Math Math Math
Private school 0.687*** 0.545*** 0.383*** 0.383***
(0.0350) (0.0366) (0.0281) (0.0237)
Private school × Female 0.0342* 0.0367** 0.0323* 0.0166
(0.0175) (0.0185) (0.0176) (0.0181)
Age control YES YES YES YES
Socio-demographic controls NO NO YES YES
District FE NO YES YES NO
Household FE NO NO NO YES
Observations 482,330 482,330 426,230 426,230
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by district. All regressions include year fixed effects. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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large, especially considering the fact that my model is designed to eliminate household-
specific bias.  
Given the presented identification strategy and resulting coefficients above, this paper 
contributes to the existing research on academic achievement and school choice in two ways. 
First, it provides evidence in the context of a developing country that fee-charging private 
schools are more effective than free public alternatives in terms of students’ learning 
outcomes. Second, my strategy is superior those of other studies which have investigated the 
impacts of school choice on academic achievement in that it controls for omitted variable bias 
and sorting effects into different types of schools with the use of household fixed effects. 
Despite these strengths, ideally I would have had access to a randomized sample of 
children in order to establish the real causal relationship between private schools and 
academic achievement. In addition, I cannot completely rule out the possibility of my findings 
suffering from selection bias. Nevertheless, I argue that my research design is, to a large 
extent, successful in dealing with this concern, yielding precise and robust estimates of the 
effectiveness of private schooling. Hence, I conclude that one can interpret the Kenyan 
evidence as providing strong support for the fact that costly private schools are more effective 
than free public schools at providing qualitative education. 
As for policy implications, these findings raise some concerns regarding the cost-
effectiveness of fee abolition programs. The disproportionate impact on the quality of public 
schools should be taken into consideration in the planning process of such large-scale 
reforms. Although free public schooling gives rise to a dramatic boost in participation rates, 
they risk undermining the amount of knowledge that children actually attain whilst in school. 
Therefore, decision makers should be careful not to focus solely on enrolment, ignoring the 
quantitative and qualitative trade-off in public schools. However, whilst there may be losses 
associated with public schools, learners seem to benefit more from private alternatives. 
Hence, I argue that further research is needed in order to fully understand the channels 
through which learner outcomes are to be improved. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table A. Heterogeneity analysis using English scores as outcome 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES English English English English
Private school 0.550*** 0.432*** 0.304*** 0.304***
(0.0231) (0.0283) (0.0200) (0.0155)
Private school × Female -0.0139 -0.0160 -0.0116 -0.0117
(0.0157) (0.0169) (0.0171) (0.0147)
Age control YES YES YES YES
Socio-demographic controls NO NO YES YES
District FE NO YES YES NO
Household FE NO NO NO YES
Observations 482,330 482,330 426,230 426,230
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by district. All regressions include year fixed effects. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B. Heterogeneity analysis using Swahili scores as outcome 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Swahili Swahili Swahili Swahili
Private school 0.509*** 0.405*** 0.280*** 0.282***
(0.0242) (0.0302) (0.0220) (0.0168)
Private school × Female -0.0137 -0.0146 -0.00869 -0.00715
(0.0154) (0.0166) (0.0172) (0.0149)
Age control YES YES YES YES
Socio-demographic controls NO NO YES YES
District FE NO YES YES NO
Household FE NO NO NO YES
Observations 482,330 482,330 426,230 426,230
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by district. All regressions include year fixed effects. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
